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CoRPORATIONs-SEcuRITIEs ExcHANGE Acrr oF 1934--MEAsURE oF SHORTSWING PROFITS UNDER SECTION 16(b)-Plaintiff stockholder brought a derivative
action against the defendant officer for profits made in violation of section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 on the purchase and sale, within six
months, of securities issued by the corporation under an "incentive" option
agreement. The contract provided that on or after the first accrual date,
until a fixed termination date, a stated number of shares could be purchased at a set price; the same privilege accrued with the identical termination date in each of the next two years. There was no dispute of fact; the
question thus centered on the computation of short-swing profits. The defendant
argued that the proper cost-base should be the market price at the date of acquisition. This was the date of the highest priced sales by the defendant, and its
use would have resulted in no profit as to the stock then acquired. The argument was based on a decision of the same court made eleven months earlier
holding the cost-base to be the date of acquisition of warrants issued yearly during an employment contract.2 On motion for summary judgrnenti held, the
proper cost-base was the market price on the date that the option accrued. The
first case in which the acquisition date was fixed by the contract is distinguishable
on its facts from the case at bar in that the officer here had the choice of exercise
dates. 3 Steinberg v. Sharpe, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 95 F. Supp. 32.
In the previous case the date of issuance of the warrants at the end of each
·year was, in effect, the date of both the acquisition and accrual of the rights. The

1 "For the purpose of preventing unfair use of information which may have been
obtained . . . by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him • • •
within any period of less than six months . . • shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer...." 48 Stat. L. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. (1941) §78p(b).
2 This standard was suggested in the dissenting opinion of Clark, Cir. J., Shaw v.
Dreyfus, (2d Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 140 at 143; and was adopted in Truncale v. Blumberg, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 88 F. Supp. 677, noted in 49 MICH. L. REv. 273 (1950). A
similar result was reached in the conversion of preferred into common stock, Park & Tilford
v. Schulte, (2d Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 984.
3 Principal case at 33.
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court had analogized such warrant issues to a payment of equal compensation
in cash.4 In the instant case, the accrual dates, fixed when the contract was entered into, are thought controlling, for they more closely parallel the hypothetical
payment dates than the date of acquiring the securities, and are free from the
subjective market considerations that an officer might weigh in choosing his
moment of exercise. Under the old rule, it is asserted, the officer could undermine the purposes5 and circumvent the penalties6 of section 16(b) by delaying
exercise of the options until the market had reached the high point he desired,
then exercise and sell. If the exercise price equaled the sales price, there would
be no profit under the act, although the officer had accomplished the speculation which the section was designed to prohibit At the very least, under the
''lowest price in, highest price out" rule, 7 the officer is given an opportunity to
weigh market factors in an attempt to reach a high subtrahend. Implicit in the
court's thinking is the reasoning that a short-swing in the market would not
likely be a reflection of the defendant's efforts as officer. Therefore he should
not be given the benefit of using his "inside" knowledge to reduce or eliminate
his liability by choosing the date which will determine cost. However, any long
term upward trend may be assumed to be due in part to the officer's endeavor,8
and such increased value should be allowed without liability as an increment of
his salary in accordance with the employment agreement. The court, by looking
to the contract accrual dates, fixed by the parties at the time the agreement is
entered into, achieves a more objective cost-base standard, while the defendant is
denied a liability avoidance device which subverts the purposes of section 16(b).

Harry T. Baumann

4 "The effect of such measurement is to treat the transaction as if, on December 12,
1945, the cqrporation had paid to defendants an amount of money sufficient to purchase
such warrants and defendants had thereupon made the purchase." Truncale v. Blumberg,
supra note 2, at 679.
Ii"••• §l6(b), specifically, was designed to protect the 'outside' stockholders against
at least short-swing speculation by insiders with advance information." Smolowe v. Delando Corp., (2d Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 231 at 235, cert. den. 320 U.S. 751, 64 S.Ct.
56 (1943). Section I6(b) is discussed in 95 Umv. PA. L. REv. 468 (1947).
6 The matching of purchases and sales within six months is done arbitrarily to produce
a maximum profit. The rationale and constitutionality of this "lowest price in, highest
price out" rule is discussed in Smolowe v. Delando Corp., supra note 5, and Gratz v.
Claughton, (2d Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 46.
7 See note 6 supra.
8 Employee distinguished from officer in Colby v. Klune, (2d Cir. 1949) 178 F. (2d)
872.

